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Life-Saving and Life-Taking: A Comment 
Richard A. McCormick, S.J. 
Father M cCormick is on the 
staff of the Kennedy Institute, 
Center for Bioethics, in Washing-
ton, D.C. He has been a frequent 
contributor to Linacre and other 
professional journals. 
The desperately ill and dying 
patient occasions many moral 
problems: the extent and quality 
of medical care and support, the 
institutional organization of in-
tensive care units (cf. Tagge in 
this issue) , the meaning of ex-
traordinary and ordinary meas-
ures of life support, the moral 
difference between omission (al-
lowing to die) and commission 
(taking life) , the provision of 
spiritual, psychological and fa-
milial comfort, the extension of 
policies and attitudes with regard 
to adult terminal patients to ba-
bies, and so on. 
All of these - and there are 
many more - are moral aspects 
of our treatment of the seriously 
ill and the dying. We tend to 
think of morality in far too nar-
row terms, terms that restrict the 
notion to certain baseline external 
acts. Actually, the morality of 
conduct includes far more. It 
must take into account inten-
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tions, desires, dispositions, atti-
tudes, emotions. Medical care 
involves persons dealing with per-
sons - and both medical prof-
fessional and patient, being per-
sons, not only perform or re-
ceive certain services, but do so 
in a context of accompanying 
emotions, desires, attitudes. be-
liefs, intentions, biographies. The 
overall moral quality of health-
care cannot be separated from a 
consideration of such factors. 
For instance, it is not impos-
sibly difficult to state that the 
Christian attitude toward life and 
death is one that sees life as a 
basic good, nut not an absolute 
one, and death as an evil but not 
an absolute evil. Such a balanced 
attitude then translates into the 
practical distinction between ordi-
nary and extraordinary means to 
preserve life. This distinction, be-
ing highly relative to circumstan-
tial conditions, is often difficult 
to describe precisely. But it be-
comes even more difficult in its 
application to this or that patient 
if we remember that the phrases 
"reasonable hope of benefit to the 
patient" and "no reasonable hope 
of benefit" must take account of 
the patient's attitudes, emotions, 
past life, value-priorities etc. The 
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simple little sentence so often 
uttered at the bedside of a dying 
patient "He would not want this" 
- this sentence leads to or ac-
companies the judgment that a 
particular means is for this pa-
tient, all things considered, ex-
traordinary and nonobligatory -
is a sentence into which is packed 
a rather thorough personal knowl-
edge of the patient, his points of 
view attitude to life and death, 
religious values, etc., with all the 
intuitive and spontaneous dimen-
sions that are involved in such 
knowledge. 
Feelings, attitudes, perceptions, 
beliefs, dispositions, therefore, do 
have an important place in the 
morality of our actions and omis-
sions, and the decisions we are 
called upon to make. But can 
such personal factors and other 
empirical data be overstressed 
and be given a decisive moral 
relevance they do not have? I be-
lieve so, and want to use a recent 
discussion to lift up this point 
for further consideration. 
The discussion concerns the re-
lationship between infanticide and 
abortion. The following problem 
has been raised: does the moral 
reasoning used with regard to 
protecting fetal life prior to vi-
ability bear any relationship to 
the protection of neonatal life? Or 
more concretely, if one approves 
abortion for serious genetic de-
fect, must he in moral consistency 
approve infanticide for those who 
have slipped through the amnio-
centesis screen? Worded differ-
ently, if one rejects neonatal 
euthanasia (active) for terribly 
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deformed babies, must he in logi-
cal consistency reject abortion 
for the same disease? 
Three Responses 
There are three responses to 
this question in contemporary 
moral writing. The first is that 
of Paul Ramsey.l He contends 
that the very arguments used to 
justify abortion will also justify 
infanticide. He makes his point in 
urging his moral position on abor-
tion - an intervention he rejects 
as immoral except in the most 
exceptional instances (involving, 
for example, the lib of the moth-
er). Thus if we refuse to commit 
infanticide, we ought also, Ram-
sey argues, to reject abortion. For 
the two procedures are, in their 
decisive moral dimensions, not 
that different. 
The second position is associat-
ed with Joseph Fletcher.2 He be-
lieves there are no clean and 
clear-cut moral differences be-
tween abortion and infanticide. 
However, he arrives at an entirely 
different practical conclusion from 
that of Ramsey. Fetal life is sub-
human and may be aborted where 
prenatal diagnosis reveals de-
formity. The same conclusion is 
advocated where euthanasia of 
elderly patients and defective 
newborns is concerned. He writes: 
If we are morally obliged to put 
an end to a pregnancy where an 
amniocentesis reveals a terribly de-
fective fetus , we are morally obliged 
to put an end to a patient's hope-
less misery when a brain scan re-
veals that a patient with cancer has 
advanced brain metastases. 
Furthermore . . . it is morally 
evasive and disingenuous to sup-
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pose that we can condemn or dis-
approve positive acts of care and 
compassion but in spite of that 
approve neg a t i v e strategies to 
achieve exactly tlie same purpose. 
This contradiction has equal force 
whether the euthanasia comes at 
the fetal point on life's spectrum 
or at some terminal point post-
natally.·1 
Both of these positions (Ram-
sey and Joseph Fletcher), re-
markably different in conclusion 
as they are, share a common con-
viction: prenatal and postnatal 
situations do not differ morally 
in any decisive ways. If one is 
willing to abort in certain cases, 
he should be willing to perform 
active euthanasia on babies in the 
same disease situation. If one is 
unwilling to perform active eu-
thanasia on a newborn, he should 
be unwilling to abort it earlier. 
The third position is that of 
John Fletcher. In a recent study 
in the prestigious New England 
Journal of Medicine , he attempts 
to show that there are morally 
relevant differences between abor-
tion and euthanasia.4 On the 
basis of these differences his po-
sition is one of rejection of active 
euthanasia for newborns, but ac-
ceptance of abortion following 
prenatal diagnosis of severe de-
formity . 
Here I wish to examine these 
differences to see if they go so far 
as to distinguish abortion and 
neonatal euthanasia morally. I 
wish to argue that Fletcher's 
three differences do not distin-
guish the two and that therefore 
a position advocating or justify-
ing abortion after prenatal diag-
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nosis of severe impairment is one 
that, in moral consistency, ought 
to advocate or justify neonatal 
euthanasia. And similarly, a posi-
tion that rejects neonatal eu-
thanasia (as John Fletcher does) 
ought, in moral consistency, to 
reject abortion also (as John 
Fletcher does not). 
If this point can be argued suc-
cessfully - or more accurately, if 
it can be shown that Fletcher's 
arguments are not persuasive -
it may be somewhat clearer how 
perceptions, intentions, disposi-
tions and other empirical and per-
sonal data, while morally relevant 
and terribly important in some 
areas, are not that decisive in 
others. 
Fletcher's first alleged "morally 
relevant difference" bet wee n 
abortion and neonatal euthanasia 
is the separate physical existence 
of the infant apart from the 
mother. This separateness, he 
says, "confronts parents, physi-
cians and legal institutions with 
independent moral claims for care 
and support." Contrarily, "before 
extrauterine viability the well-
being of the fetus should not be 
considered independently fro m 
the mother's condition." Fletcher 
sees as "extreme" the position 
that regards the fetus as already 
a human being because such a 
position "provides no rational 
grounds for the legitimate inter-
ests of parents, family and society 
to be expressed and guided in 
abortion decisions." 
Here it must be insisted that 
separate physical existence does 
indeed confront parents, physi-
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cians and legal institutions with 
independent moral claims. And 
the fetus' intrauterine existence 
does indeed mean that the treat-
ment of the fetus cannot be con-
sidered "independently from the 
mother's condition." Classical 
theology has always granted this. 
Nor, I would add, can the moth-
er's con d i t ion be approached 
medically in total independence 
of the fact that she is pregnant. 
That being said, however, the cru-
cial question is this : while the 
claims of the separate child are 
independent, and the claims of 
the fetus occur within a depend-
ency relationship, are these inde-
pendent and dependent claims 
that different ? And if they are, 
on what grounds? Physical de-
pendence and separateness are 
but facts. To' say that a moral 
claim is dependent is not to de-
lineate the strength of that claim. 
The classical position, of course, 
has been that the moral claims of 
the fetus are very strong, indeed 
so strong that only life-saving in-
terventions (e.g., ectopic preg-
nancies) or their equivalent are 
compatible with the rights of the 
growing fetus. Fletcher simply 
does not address this issue, and 
for that reason his first difference 
does not establish a morally rele-
vant difference between abortion 
and euthanasia; Fletcher merely 
asserts such a difference. 
The Second Major Difference 
Fletcher's second major differ-
ence between abortion and neo-
natal euthanasia is "the fact that 
after birth the disease in the in-
fant is more available to physi-
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cians for palliation or perhaps 
even cure. Confrontation with dis-
ease in an independently existing 
life requires physicians to respond 
within their obligations to heal 
and to relieve suffering." I fail 
to see how the availability of dis-
ease to treatment distinguishes 
abortion from euthanasia. Grant-
ed, it is difficult if not impossible 
to treat the fetus in utero in 
many cases. All that means is 
that it is difficult or impossible. 
How does one use that difficulty 
to establish a morally significant 
difference between two actions 
which are in no sense treatment 
of the fetus and child, but de-
structive acts visited upon either 
fetus or child? 
If Fletcher accepts "availabili-
ty to physicians for palliation or 
perhaps even cure" as establish-
ing a morally significant differ-
ence between abo r t ion and 
infanticide, it must be because he 
supposes that if one is unavailable 
(in utero) for palliation or cure, 
he may be disposed of. But that 
has nowhere been established in 
his study, and indeed is at the 
heart of the abortion controversy. 
Fletcher concludes: "For the 
present . .. the real situation for 
parents and physicians is that 
they must wait until birth to re-
spond to the specificity of a dis-
ease with decisions to treat or not 
to treat. " True, but" therefore 
what ... ? 
Fletcher's third morally rele-
vant difference is that "parental 
acceptance of the infant as a real 
person is much more developed at 
birth than in the earlier stages of 
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pregnancy." He then states that 
"we should expect loyalty to the 
developing life to grow, change, 
and moderate the ambivalence 
about the fetus usually present in 
the parents." Here several things 
must be noted. First, granted that 
acceptance is much more devel-
oped at birth, the question re-
mains open and untouched about 
what even the initial acceptance 
ought to be, about what it 
ought to prescribe and proscribe 
with regard to fetal life. 
Secondly, granted that loyalty 
(or better, a sense of loyalty or 
experienced loyalty) grows as the 
fetus grows, the question remains 
open and untouched about what 
even the initial stirrings of lbyalty 
demand of us where protection 
of fetal life is concerned. Fletcher 
nowhere addresses these ques-
tions and they are essential if the 
differences he identifies are to 
add up to moral differences be-
tween abortion and euthanasia. If 
Fletcher argues that this growth 
and change in the sense of loyalty 
to nascent life establishes a mor-
ally significant difference be-
tween abortion and euthanasia, 
it is only because he has supposed 
that it is a greater or lesser sense 
of parental loyalty that founds 
the fetus' rights and claims, and 
generates our obligations to it. 
A Manifestly Erroneous Position 
This is not merely undemon-
strated; it is, I believe, manifestly 
erroneous. It is not our sense of, 
experience of loyalty or accept-
ance that shapes our obligations. 
It is rather the objective reality 
of the fetus that ought to found 
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our obligations and nurture our 
sense of loyalty. If that sense of 
loyalty in early pregnancy is such 
that it allows abortion, then we 
must deal earnestly with the pos-
sibility that our sense of loyalty 
is not what it should be, that it 
has been blunted by cultural 
forces, etc. To say otherwise is 
to make the fragile and vulner-
able sense of acceptance and 
loyalty normative-which would, 
among other things, collapse mor-
ality into headcounting. In sum-
mary, in appealing to the sense 
of acceptance and loyalty, Fletch-
er has appealed to human per-
ceptions. To accept these as es-
tablishing a "morally relevant 
difference" between abortion and 
euthanasia of the newborn is to 
accept human perceptions as nor-
mative - which is, unless some-
thing further is added, to forfeit 
the capacity to criticize these 
perceptions. 
Fletcher's study concludes with 
this statement: "The effect of 
these three differences is to es-
tablish the n€wborn infant, even 
with a serious defect, as a fellow 
human being who deserves pro-
tection on both a legal and ethical 
basis ... " Clearly, the newborn 
are fellow humans deserving of 
protection. But if Fletcher's main 
contention (moral difference be-
tween abortion and euthanasia) 
is to stand up, he should have 
concluded: "The effect of these 
three differences is to establish 
the fetus as not a fellow human 
being." Fletcher has not succeed-
ed in doing this. 
I have raised this question here 
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precisely in order to underline 
both the moral relevance of per-
sonal factors (perceptions, dispo-
sitions, attitudes, etc.) and the 
limits of this relevance. While 
such factors do have input and 
importance in the quality-of-life 
judgments so often hidden in the 
terms "ordinary" and "extraordi-
nary" means,.' they do not, I sub-
mit, found and constitute the 
very existence and personhood of 
the individual. Unless that is kept 
in mind, the lives and rights of 
others will be endangered. 
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